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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BRUNO D1ASTON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 89-0050CA

DOROTHY DfASTON, et al.,
Defendant-Appellant,

PETITION FOR REHEARING

PETITION AND CERTIFICATION OF GOOD FAITH
Plaintiff-respondent Bruno D1Aston hereby petitions this
Court, pursuant to Rule 3 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, for a rehearing of this matter.

The points of law

and fact which petitioner claims the Court has overlooked or
misapprehended
argument.

are

set

forth

in detail

in the

following

Counsel for petitioner hereby certifies, by his

signature below, that this petition is presented in good faith
and not for delay.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Does the Court's opinion improperly restrict the

discretion of the trial court on remand by holding that the
1973 agreement is binding as a matter of law, even though there
exists evidence which would support the trial court in finding

that unique and compelling circumstances exist to justify
varying from the agreement, or that the agreement was rescinded
by the conduct of the parties?
2.

Is the "unique and compelling circumstances" test

adopted by this Court in conflict with prior decisions of this
Court and of the Utah Supreme Court?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case,

This is an action for divorce.

The complaint also named the parties1 two adult children as
defendants and sought an order compelling the defendant wife
and the children to return to the plaintiff husband certain
personal property alleged to have been stolen from the husband.
B.

Prior and Related Proceedings.

The Court's opinion

was filed June 14, 1990, and is reported at 13 6 Utah Adv. Rep.
47.

A copy appears in Appendix A.
A description of the proceedings below prior to the filing

of the Notice of Appeal is set forth in the initial briefs of
the parties. Subsequent to the filing of the Notice of Appeal,
plaintiff ("Husband") proceeded on his claims against; defendant
Eric Aston.

An Order and Decree substantially in favor of

plaintiff was entered on March 9, 1990. Eric Aston subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal (Case No. 900223-CA), and plaintiff
filed a Notice of Cross Appeal (Case No. 900281-CA).
appeal and cross appeal were consolidated

2

The

under Case No.

900223-CA by Order entered June 1, 1990.

A copy of the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law appears in Appendix B,
and the Order and Decree appealed from appears in Appendix C.
During the pendency of the instant appeal, the trial court
found defendant ("Wife") to be in contempt of court by reason
of her failure to comply with certain provisions of the Decree
of Divorce. By opinion entered April 9, 1990, this Court held
that this

appeal would

be dismissed

unless Mrs. D1Aston

submitted herself to the process of the trial court within
thirty days of the issuance of the opinion.
DfAston, 790 P.2d 590 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
opinion appears in Appendix D.)

Df Aston v.

(A copy of the

On May 4, 1990, Wife repre-

sented to this Court that she had submitted herself to the
process of the trial court. She remained, however, in contempt
of the trial court's order.

On May 22, 1990, the trial court

entered an Order (a copy of which is attached as Appendix E ) .
The trial court gave Wife until June 22, 1990, to purge herself
of the contempt by depositing with the court the money which
she had previously and incorrectly represented to the court was
in a safety deposit box.

Defendant remained in contempt of

court at the time this Court's opinion was issued on June 14,
1990.
C.

Statement of Facts.

Most of the facts relevant to

this action are set forth in the initial briefs of the parties
and in the Court's opinion.

Such additional facts as are

3

necessary to a consideration of this petition are set forth
below in connection with the argument.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The 1973 agreement which was the subject of this Court's
opinion essentially conveyed the parties' real property to Wife
and the personal property to Husband.

Husband's personal

property consisted largely of coin collections.

The evidence

showed and the trial court found that the parties continued to
conduct their affairs after the execution of the 1973 agreement
as though it did not exist.

Husband presented evidence that

his son, apparently acting under the direction and with the
cooperation of Wife, stole most of Husband's personal property
on April 30, 1986.

The trial court did not make any finding

as to whether the theft occurred but did hold that if the items
which were the subject of the theft appeared in the possession
of either party, that party would be held in contempt. Certain
of the stolen items were subsequently found in Eric Aston's
possession. Because Wife made herself unavailable for process,
Husband has not yet been able to bring further proceedings
against Wife based on this additional evidence.
This Court's opinion, however, appears to hold that Wife
is' entitled to all the property granted her under the 1973
agreement as a matter of law, notwithstanding that there is
evidence which would support a trial court finding that the
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agreement was rescinded by the conduct of the parties, and that
Wife participated in stealing all the property conveyed to
Husband under the agreement.

This Court holds that a post-

nuptial agreement is absolutely binding on the trial court
unless

"unique and compelling

circumstances" exist.

The

"unique and compelling circumstances" test is unsupported by
citation.

Prior decisions of this Court and of the Utah

Supreme Court have held that similar agreements entered into
during the course of the marriage but in contemplation of
divorce, are not binding on the trial court.

Such agreements

are considered to be a recommendation only to the court, to be
adhered to if it is "fair and reasonable."
There is no logical or legal justification for giving only
advisory effect to an agreement entered into by the parties
when they are aware of all of their current assets and circumstances, but giving conclusive

effect to an agreement

entered into at a previous time, even though circumstances may
have changed.
This Court should vacate its prior opinion and hold that
a post-nuptial agreement in this case is binding between the
parties in determining the status of property as separate as
of the time of the divorce.
the discretion

The trial court should be given

to apply traditional

rules concerning the

division of separate property in a divorce action.

5

Because the trial court held that the 1973 agreement was
not intended to be enforced between the parties, the trial
court did not have occasion to reach the issues of whether the
agreement had been rescinded by the conduct of the parties, or
whether the circumstances justified varying from the agreement.
The facts on these issues are in dispute, and it is error for
this Court to hold otherwise as a matter of law.
Finally, appellant-wife remains in contempt of the trial
court has failed to fully satisfy this Court's directive in its
prior opinion.

The appeal should be dismissed because appel-

lant failed to comply with this Court's prior opinion.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE HOLDING OF THIS COURT IMPROPERLY
RESTRICTS THE DISCRETION OF THE
TRIAL COURT ON REMAND.
A.

Unique And Compelling Circumstances Exist To Justify

Varying From The 1973 Agreement.
Bruno D1Aston ("Husband") testified at trial that on April
30, 1986, after he had returned from a coin show in the State
of Washington, Dorothy ("Wife") invited him to share coffee
with her.

While Wife was thus occupying him, their son, Eric

Aston, broke into Husband's vehicle and removed hundreds of
thousands of dollars worth of coins and other valuable assets.
Eric then returned and stated to his father, in the presence
6

of his mother, that he, Eric, had removed the coins because
"we" could no longer trust Bruno D'Aston.

(Tr. 60.) The items

stolen included nearly all of the assets conveyed to Husband
under the 1973 agreement.
Wife and Eric disputed Husband's testimony.

The trial

court determined that it was not necessary to make a finding
as to what occurred, because the trial court held that the 1973
agreement was not enforceable

in any event.

This Court

disagreed and held the 1973 agreement to be enforceable. This
Court held that post-nuptial agreements are enforceable unless
"unique and compelling circumstances" exist to justify varying
from the agreement. Husband establishes below in Point II that
the "unique and compelling circumstances" test is not proper.
Even if the test is applied, however, unique and compelling
circumstances exist in this case.
This Court does not define what would constitute "unique
and compelling circumstances," but states in a footnote that
"[t]he trial court made no findings to delineate what it found
as compelling circumstances to justify such an action and we
find none."

13 6 Utah Adv. Rep. at 50, n. 6.

The trial court

did not delineate what it found as compelling circumstances,
however, because it had found the 1973 agreement to be unenforceable in any event.
This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have had several
occasions to consider what constitutes sufficient grounds to

7

divide separate property.

A review of the cases demonstrates

that the same test should be applied in this case, and that the
evidence in this case was sufficient to justify varying from
the post-nuptial agreement.
In Noble v. Noble, 761 P. 2d 1369 (Utah 1988) , for example,
the Court held that the trial court properly awarded a portion
of the husband's separate property to the wife where the wife
had no income or assets and where her present financial needs
were the result of the husband's tortious conduct. This Court
asserts that Noble is distinguishable because
involve a prenuptial or postnuptial agreement.

it did not
The critical

issue, however, is that the standard applied in Noble is the
same as this Court has previously held applies where a property
settlement agreement has been made.

The Court in Noble held:

[T]here is no per se ban on awarding one
spouse a portion of the premarital assets
of another.
In fact, our cases have
consistently held that under appropriate
circumstances, achieving a fair, just, and
equitable result may require that the trial
court exercise its discretion to award one
spouse the premarital property of the
other.
761 P.2d at 1373 (citations omitted).
This language

is remarkably similar to that used in

Coleman v. Coleman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), a case
which did involve a postnuptial agreement (although executed
in contemplation of divorce):
[I]t is well recognized that a parties1
stipulation as to property rights in a
8

divorce action, although advisory and
usually followed unless the court finds it
to be unfair or unreasonable, is not
necessarily binding on the trial court.
It is only a recommendation to be adhered
to if the court believes it to be fair and
reasonable.
743 P.2d at 789 (citations omitted).
Theft must certainly be considered to be a compelling
circumstance.

Evidence exists which would support a finding

that Wife stole the coins from Husband.

Although the location

of the coins was not known at the time this case was tried,
some of the coins have subsequently been discovered in Eric
Aston1s possession. This corroborates Husband's testimony that
Eric and Dorothy DfAston conspired to steal the coins from
Husband.
The Court's holding leaves Husband without an effective
remedy.

Wife assisted in the theft of all of the assets

conveyed to Husband under the 1973 agreement, but this Court
nonetheless prohibits the trial court from ordering her to make
compensation to Husband from the assets she received under the
1973 agreement.
The trial court should be granted discretion to make
whatever orders are necessary and just in this case.

Having

held that the trial court was in error in its interpretation
of the 1973 agreement, this Court should now remand the case
to the trial court to make whatever decree is just and ap-
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propriate under the circumstances of the case, yet in harmony
with this Court's interpretation of the agreement.
B.

The 1973 Agreement Was Rescinded By Conduct.

This Court held that post-nuptial agreements are to be
interpreted the same as any other contract.

As such, as with

pre-nuptial agreements, the contract can be rescinded by the
conduct of the parties.

In re Marriage of Young, 682 P.2d

1233, 1236 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); see also Berman v. Berman,
749 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Because the trial court in this case held that the postnuptial agreement was never intended to be binding between the
parties, the court had no occasion to determine whether the
agreement was subsequently rescinded by the conduct of the
parties.

The court did find, however, that "subsequent to the

date of the agreement, the parties continued their married
lives together, and bought and sold property as though the
agreement did not really exist, except that certain real
properties were changed to the name of defendant Dorothy
D'Aston."

(R. 456.)

There is adequate evidence to support

this finding, as demonstrated in the parties1 initial briefs.
Those findings must be upheld:
We will not set aside a trial court's
finding of fact unless it is against the
clear weight of the evidence or we otherwise reach a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been mae. [Citations.]
We may regard a finding as clearly erroneous only if the finding is without
adequate evidentiary support or is induced
10

by an erroneous view of the law,
tions, ]

[Cita-

Smith v, Linmar Energy Corp,, 790 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990) (J. Billings).
The testimony in this case is sufficient to support the
findings.

To the extent that Husband's evidence was weaker

than Wife's, it was because Wife had denied Husband access to
his records,

(R. 754, 757.) This Court should grant the trial

court discretion on remand to further inquire into that issue
and make detailed findings as to whether the agreement was
rescinded by the conduct of the parties.
POINT II
THE "UNIQUE AND COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES" TEST
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY AND CONFLICTS WITH
PRIOR DECISIONS OF THIS COURT AND
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT.
A.

The 1973 Agreement Determines Only The Status Of The

Property, And Not Its Ultimate Disposition By The Divorce
Court.
Husband does not, for the purposes of this Petition for
Rehearing, contest

this Court's holding that the parties

intended the 1973 agreement to be binding, and that the agreement was unambiguous.

Husband respectfully submits, however,

that this Court has misinterpreted the agreement. The critical
portion of the agreement states as follows:
3. Hereafter, and until this agreement is modified in writing attached
hereto, all property, real, personal and
11

mixed, acquired by either party in his or
her sole name, from whatever source derived
and wherever situated, shall be the sole
and separate property of such person,
notwithstanding any law, statute, or court
decision giving presumptive effect to the
status of marriage; and such property shall
be free of all claims, demand [sic] or
liens of the other, direct or indirect, and
however derived.
Defendant's Exhibit 37 (emphasis added).
This Court held that the emphasized

portion clearly

indicated an intent that the agreement be binding and conclusive on any divorce court.

136 Utah Adv. Rep. at 49.

The

agreement does not, however, state that it is binding on any
"court decision."

It is only intended to be binding on those

court decisions which give "presumptive effect to the status
of marriage."

In other words, the agreement prohibits the

court from presuming, solely by reason of the marriage, that
the property was community or marital property.

The agreement

only determines the status of the property as separate.
This argument is supported by Parkhurst v. Gibson, 573
A.2d 454 (N.H. 1990).

The prenuptial agreement at issue in

that case stated, among other things, that "[i]t is mutually
declared that it is the intention of the parties to this
agreement that by virtue of their prospective marriage neither
one shall have nor acquire any right, title or claim in and to
the real or personal estate of the other party . . . ."
A.2d at 456.

573

The agreement did not however, specifically use
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the words "divorce," "alimony," or "property settlement," but
appeared to be directed at determining the status of the
parties1

property

for inheritance purposes.

The subject

agreement in this case similarly does not specifically refer
to divorce or to a property settlement in divorce, and should
be read as only determining the status of the property as
separate.
Husband does not contest, for the purposes of this Petition

for Rehearing, that the 1973

agreement

conclusively

establishes the status of the property as separate.

In Utah,

the general rule is that "in appropriate circumstances, equity
will require that each party retain the separate property
brought to the marriage."
(Utah 1987).

Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135

By designating the property as separate, there-

fore, the 1973 agreement created a presumption that the property would remain the property of Wife.

The trial court must

treat the property as separate property. As with any separate
property, however, the court can order one party to convey
portions of his or her separate property to the other in order
to achieve equity under the circumstances of the case.

Id.

Although the agreement mandates that the property be dealt with
by a divorce court as separate property, nothing in the agreement can be read as prohibiting the divorce court from otherwise treating the property the same as any other separate
property.
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B.

No Logical Or Legal Basis Exists To Give Greater

Effect To A Post-Nuptial Agreement Than To A Property Settlement Agreement.
In Coleman v. Coleman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1987),
the court considered the effect to be given to a property
settlement agreement executed in contemplation of a divorce.
The court held as follows:
[I]t is well recognized that a parties1
stipulation as to property rights in a
divorce action, although advisory and
usually followed unless the court finds it
to be unfair or unreasonable, is not
necessarily binding on the trial court.
It is only a recommendation to be adhered
to if the court believes it to be fair and
reasonable.
743 P.2d at 789 (citing Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080, 1082
(Utah 1987); Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah 1975)).
It is not clear from the court's opinion in Coleman
whether the property settlement agreement was executed prior
to the commencement of the divorce action or during the pendency of the divorce proceedings. The distinction does not appear
critical for the purposes of that decision.
In the instant action, in contrast, the court holds that
if a property settlement agreement is executed at some unspecified earlier time, at a time when the parties are not
immediately contemplating divorce but at a time when divorce
is certainly foreseeable, the agreement becomes not merely
advisory if "fair and reasonable," but conclusively binding

14

unless "unique and compelling" circumstances exist. This Court
does not cite to any prior case law establishing such a distinction, and Husband is not aware of any.
Husband respectfully submits that no logical basis exists
for giving greater effect to a postnuptial agreement (whether
executed one year or twenty years before the divorce) than to
a property settlement agreement.

Logic would dictate that the

pre-divorce (postnuptial) agreement be given less weight, not
greater. A property settlement agreement is entered into with
the contemplation that it will be enforced within a short
period of time after execution.

The parties are presumably

aware of all the facts and circumstances which will be in
existence at the time the agreement is enforced.

The post-

nuptial agreement in this case, in contrast, was executed
nearly fifteen years before enforcement was sought. There has
been a vast and material change in circumstances subsequent to
the execution of the agreement.

Husband respectfully submits

that there is no legal or logical reason for giving greater
effect to the contract which was executed with less knowledge.1

Alternatively, this Court should adopt the standards for
enforcement of a prenuptial (or postnuptial) agreement as set
forth in Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044 (Alaska 1987). The
court held that the following three criteria are generally
considered in determining whether to enforce such an agreement:
1.
Was the agreement obtained through fraud,
duress or mistake, or misrepresentation or nondisclosure of material fact?
15

It is important to emphasize that Husband does not dispute, for purposes of this Point, that the 1973 agreement
mandates that the trial court treat the designated properties
as separate property.

Once the property is properly labeled

as either separate or marital, however, the trial court should
be granted a latitude of discretion in dividing the property
equal or greater to that applicable when dealing with a property settlement agreement.
Once it is determined that the property is separate, the
following guidelines apply in determining whether it should be
divided:
Premarital property, gifts, and inheritances may be viewed as separate
property, and in appropriate circumstances,
equity will require that each party retain
the separate property brought to the
marriage. However, the rule is not invariable. In fashioning an equitable property
division, trial courts need consider all
of the pertinent circumstances.
The
factors generally to be considered are the
amount and kind of property to be divided;
whether the property was acquired before
or during the marriage; the source of the
property; the health of the parties; the

2.
Was
executed?

the

agreement

unconscionable

when

3.
Have the facts and circumstances changed
since the agreement was executed, so as to make its
enforcement unfair and unreasonable?
Brooks, 733 P.2d at 1049 (citing Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga.
635, 292 S.E.2d 662, 666 (1982)). The "unfair and unreasonable" test in the third factor is identical to that applied by
Utah courts with respect to property settlement agreements.
Coleman, 743 P.2d at 789.
16

parties1 standard of living, respective
financial conditions, needs, and earning
capacity; the duration of the marriage; the
children of the marriage; the parties1 ages
at time of marriage and of divorce; what
the parties gave up by the marriage; and
the necessary relationship the property
division has with the amount of alimony and
child support to be awarded. Of particular
concern in a case such as this is whether
one spouse has made any contribution toward
the growth of the separate assets of the
other spouse and whether the assets were
accumulated or enhanced by the joint
efforts of the parties.
Burke v. Burke, 733 P. 2d 133, 135
omitted) .

(Utah 1987)

(footnotes

The trial court did not have any reason to make

findings on these issues, because it had already determined
that the 1973 agreement was not enforceable and that all the
property was marital property. The trial court should be
permitted on remand to exercise its discretion in accordance
with the principles set forth above.
POINT III
WIFE SHOULD BE GRANTED NO RELIEF WHERE SHE
REMAINED IN CONTEMPT OF THE TRIAL COURT.
In its prior decision in this case, this Court held that
Wife was required to "submit herself to the jurisdiction of the
trial court and satisfy that court's concerns before she may
exercise that right [to appeal]. 790 P. 2d at 594. Wife failed
to comply with this requirement.

Although she did appear at

a hearing, she remained in contempt of the trial court.

This

Court's second opinion should be vacated until and unless Wife

17

purges the contempt.

Wife may and should be punished for her

contempt even though the underlying order may be incorrect.
See In re Contempt of Reeves, 112 Idaho 574, 733 P.2d 795 (Ct.
App. 1987).
Wife failed to "satisfy" the trial court's concerns within
the time frame previously set by this Court. The appeal should
be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Husband does not contest, for purposes of this Petition,
this Court's holding that the 1973 agreement was intended to
be binding by the parties.

The agreement by its terms, how-

ever, only identifies the property as separate.

Prior deci-

sions of this Court and of the Utah Supreme Court provide that
the trial court may, in the exercise of its discretion, require
a party to make a conveyance of separate property when necessary to achieve equity.
Even under the "unique and compelling circumstances" test
adopted by this Court, the evidence would support a finding
that such circumstances existed.
The Court's opinion should be modified and the holding
limited to determining that the 1973 agreement was intended to
be binding between the parties.

This Court should hold that

the agreement determined the status of the property to be
separate and should remand the case to the trial court to deal

18

with the property as separate property in accordance with prior
decisions of this Court and the Utah Supreme Court.
Finally, the appeal should be dismissed because Wife did
not bring herself into compliance with the trial court's order
prior to the issuance of this Court's second opinion.
day of July, 1990.

DATED this

S. REX LEWIS and
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Respondent

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this
12th day of July, 1990.
Brian C. Harrison, for:
HARRIS, CARTER & HARRISON
3 325 No. University Avenue
Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84 604
Attorneys for Appellant
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agreed upon.
In its findings of fact, the trial court determined that the initial two leases negotiated by
Galaxy Advertising authorized the placement
of the signs on specific sites which were the
same locations occupied by the signs at the
time the present parties executed the existing
lease, and that the parties intended the lease to
continue Reagan's right to maintain the signs
only in their existing locations. Although the
evidence is controverted, "we assume that the
trial judge believed those aspects of the evidence and the inferences reasonably drawn
from them that support his decision." Redevelopment Agency, 785 P.2d at 1122 (quoting
Brixen & Christopher, Architects v. Elton, 111
P.2d 1037, 1042 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). Under
our standard of review, we will not set aside a
trial court's findings unless they are against
the clear weight of the evidence or we otherwise reach a definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been made, Smith v. Linmar
Energy Corp., 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 52, 53 (Ct.
App. 1990), and we give deference to the trial
court's findings and its opportunity to judge
the credibility of the witnesses. Utah R. Civ.
P. 52(a).
Having examined the record, we conclude
that the trial court's findings have adequate
evidentiary support and are not clearly erroneous. We, therefore, affirm its judgment.
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
1. The 1971 leases described the locations as
follows: (1) one location across from state road shed
on highway, and (2) one location 300 feet south of
state road shed on highway.
2. Reid stated that it was his intent to work out an
agreement whereby they
could keep the signs next to the highway
and if he built or developed — well,
we realized that if he came up with
another use for the property that was
more economically profitable for him,
that at that point in time it might come
about that we might have to remove the
signs. But until that happened, or if he
only developed pan of it, or whatever,
that we would like to have the ability to
stay on the property until he had totally
utilized the property .... My understanding is that if part of it were developed
and a piece was left undeveloped, that
you could relocate the sign.
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IN THE
U T A H COURT OF APPEALS
Bruno D'ASTON,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Dorothy D'ASTON, et al.,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 890050-CA
FILED: June 14, 1990
Fourth District, Utah County
Honorable Boyd L. Park
ATTORNEYS:
Brian C. Harrison, Provo, for Appellant
S. Rex Lewis and Leslie W. Slaugh, Provo,
for Appellee
Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Orme.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
Appellant, Dorothy D'Aston ("Wife"),
appeals from a divorce decree entered by the
district court, principally claiming the court
erred in failing to distribute the parties' property pursuant to a postnuptial agreement.
On appeal, Bruno D'Aston ("Husband")
responded that since Wife was in contempt of
the trial court and was avoiding court process,
this court should not consider her appeal on
the merits. We agreed with Husband and
ordered Wife to submit herself to the process
of the trial court within 30 days or we would
dismiss her appeal. See D'Aston v. DfAston,
132 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Ct. App. 1990). Wife
gave us notice of her compliance with our
order on May 4, 1990, and therefore we
address the merits' of her appeal in this
opinion.
We agree with Wife's contention that the
trial court erred in failing to distribute the
parties' property pursuant to their postnuptial
agreement and therefore reverse and remand.
Husband and Wife divorced on December
15, 1988, after a 35-year marriage. In 1973,
Husband asked Wife to enter into a written
property agreement, which had been prepared
by his attorney. The agreement was executed
by both parties in 1973, then notarized and
recorded in the State of California in 1975.
Under the 1973 agreement, Wife received
two parcels of real estate and cash. Husband
received all real property outside the United
States; personal property in his possession,
which included SI million in coins and a collection of antique cars; and all domestic and
foreign patents and patent rights. The agreement also provided that all propertv acauired

48

136 Utah i

by either party in his/her own name would
be the separate property of that person.
Finally, the agreement provided that the
parties would execute documents to implement
the agreement, and that each had the advice of
counsel, had read the agreement, and had not
signed the agreement under duress, fraud or
undue influence. Shortly after the agreement
was signed, the parties conveyed the property
as provided in the agreement.
On May 2, 1986, Husband filed for divorce.
Husband claimed that much of the tangible
personal property given to him under the 1973
agreement had been stolen on April 30, 1986,
the day Wife had asked him to leave their
home. On July 31, 1986, Husband's California attorney, who had drafted the 1973 agreement, sent a letter to Wife's Utah attorney
which stated the 1973 agreement was in full
force and effect.
Both parties at trial acknowledged they
executed the 1973 agreement voluntarily and
did not execute it under duress, fraud or
undue influence. However, at trial, Husband
claimed the 1973 agreement should not control
the disposition of the parties' property in this
divorce action because the agreement was
entered into only to protect the couple's assets
from possible creditors in pending litigation,
not to distribute property in the event of
divorce. Wife at trial claimed she had no
knowledge of the alleged pending litigation
and assumed the 1973 agreement was to
control for all purposes, including the possibility of divorce.
The trial court held the 1973 agreement was
not intended to control in the event of
divorce, and thus, equitably divided all of the
parties' property and awarded no alimony to
either party. Wife appeals, claiming that (1)
the trial court erred in dividing the parties'
separate property in this divorce action contrary to the terms of the 1973 agreement, (2)
the trial court erred in denying Wife alimony,
and (3) the conduct of the trial judge constituted judicial bias.
VALIDITY OF POSTNUPTIAL
AGREEMENTS
In Utah, prenuptial agreements are enforceable as long as there is no fraud, coercion or
material nondisclosure.1 Utah's courts have
not yet considered the enforceability of postnuptial agreements not in contemplation of
divorce.. However, other jurisdictions review
postnuptial property agreements under the
same standards as those applied to prenuptial
agreements.2
We agree with the majority of our neighboring jurisdictions and thus hold that a postnuptial agreement is enforceable in Utah
absent fraud, coercion, or material nondisclosure.3
Neither Husband nor Wife assert that the
icm nrnnerrv agreement was entered into as a
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result of fraud or coercion nor do they
contend that there was material nondisclosure
of the parties' assets. Thus, this postnuptial
agreement should be enforced pursuant to its
terms.
Our conclusion, however, does not resolve
this controversy as Husband and Wife disagree
as to the meaning and scope of the 1973 postnuptial property agreement. Wife contends
the agreement by its unambiguous terms
applies in the event of divorce. Husband
argues that it was executed merely to protect
the parties' property from creditors and was
not intended to control a distribution of the
parties' property in the event of divorce.
Thus, we must determine what the parties
intended when they entered into this 1973
agreement.
Utah courts have applied general contract
principles when interpreting prenuptial agreements. See Berman v. Berman, 749 P.2d 1271,
1273 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (A prenuptial
agreement should be treated like any other
contract. "In interpreting contracts, the principal concern is to determine what the parties
intended by what they said."). This approach
is consistent with other jurisdictions' treatment of postnuptial agreements.4
Thus, in order to resolve Husband and
Wife's disagreement as to the scope and
meaning of this postnuptial agreement, we
apply normal rules of contract construction.
The core principle is that in construing this
contract, we first look to the four corners of
the agreement to determine the parties' intentions. See Neilson v. Neilson, 780 P.2d 1264,
1267 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); see also Ron Case
Roofing & Asphalt Paving Co. v. Blomquist,
773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989); LDS Hosp.
v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858
(Utah 1988); Buehner Block Co. v. UWC
Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988).
The relevant provisions of the 1973 agreement denoting its scope and application state,
with our emphasis:
1. The husband does transfer,
bargain, convey and quitclaim to
the wife all of his right, title and
interest, if any there be, in and to
the following:
(a) The real property at 14211
Skyline Drive, Hacienda Heights,
California and in and to ail buildings, appurtenances and fixtures
thereon.
(b) The real property at 230
South Ninth Avenue, City of Industry, California, including all
buildings, appurtenances and fixtures thereon, and any and all oil
and mineral rights thereto.
(c) Any and all cash in bank
accounts located in the State of
California.

2. The wife transfers, bargains,
conveys and quitclaims to the
husband ail of her right, title and
interest in and to real property
located outside of the United States
of America, and in and to all personal property in the possession of
the husband, or subject to his
control in the United States, Europe
or elsewhere in the world, and in
and to all patents or patent rights
under the laws of the United States,
United Kingdom or any commonwealth thereof, Switzerland, Japan
or other countries. The provisions
of this paragraph apply to all property described herein, whether
presently owned or in existence or
to be acquired or created in the
future.
3. Hereafter, and until this agreement is modified in writing attached
hereto, all property, real, personal
and mixed, acquired by either party
in his or her sole name, from whatever source derived and wherever
situated, shall be the sole and separate property of such person, notwithstanding any law, statute or
court decision giving presumptive
effect to the status of marriage; and
such property shall be free of all
claims, demand or liens of the
other, direct or indirect, and
however derived.
This postnuptial agreement provides that
Husband and Wife's propeny will be divided
and the division will control for all purposes.
The agreement was entered into in a community property state and the contractual language unambiguously and specifically refers to
rebutting the presumption that all property
acquired during the marriage is community
property.
The trial court did not expressly conclude
that the 1973 property agreement was ambiguous, but nevertheless proceeded to take extrinsic evidence5 as to the parties' intentions
and, based upon this controverted extrinsic
evidence, concluded that the parties did not
intend the 1973 agreement ta apply in the
event of divorce.
The threshold determination of whether a
writing is ambiguous is a question of law,
Buehner Block Co., 752 P.2d at 895; Faulkner
v. Famsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah
1983); Whitehouse v. Whitehouser 131 Utah
Adv. Rep. 28 r 30 (Ct. App. 1990), and thus
we review a trial court's determination under
a„ -correction-of-error standard, according
no particular deference to the trial court. Id.;
see also Seashores Inc. v. Hancey, 738 P.2d
645, 647 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
We find this postnuptial agreement unamUTAH

biguousiy provides that it will apply to a disposition of the parties' propeny in the event
of divorce.6 Thus, we reverse the trial court's
contrary ruling which was based upon extrinsic
evidence as to what Husband and Wife intended by their 1973 agreement.
In summary, we reverse the trial court's
property distribution and remand for enforcement of the 1973 postnuptial property agreement and then the division of the remaining
property, if any, not controlled by it. Because
we reverse and remand the property division,
we also reverse and remand on the issue of
alimony. We believe our decision necessitates
the reconsideration of whether either Husband
or Wife should receive alimony.7
Judith M. Billings, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
1. See Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah
1986) ("it should be noted that in general, prenuptiai
agreements concerning the disposition of propeny
owned by the parties at the time of their marriage
are valid so long as there is no fraud, coercion or
material nondisclosure"); Berman v. Berman, 749
P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
2. See In re Estate of Harber, 104 Ariz. 79, 449
P.2d 7, 16 (1969) (en banc) ("[M]arital partners may
in Arizona validly divide their property presently
and prospectively by a post-nuptial agreement,
even without its being incident to a contemplated
separation or divorce," provided it is fair and equitable and is free from fraud, coercion or undue
influence and that "wife acted with full knowledge
of the propeny involved and her rights therein."); In
re Estate of Lewin, 42 Colo. App. 129, 595 P.2d
1055, 1057 (1979) ("Nuptial agreements, whether
executed before or after the marriage, are enforceable in Colorado [and a] nuptial agreement will be
upheld unless the person attacking it proves fraud,
concealment, or failure to disclose material information."). See also In re Estate of Loughmiller, 229
Kan. 584, 629 P.2d 156, 162 (1981) (postnuptial
agreements, fairly and understanding^ made, are
enforceable); In re Estate of Gab, 364 N.W.2d 924,
925-26 (S.D. 1985) (postnuptial agreement to
protect inheritance rights valid if property fairly
disclosed and spouse enters into freely and for good
consideration); Button v. Button, 131 Wis. 2d 84,
388 N.W.2d 546, 550-51 (1986) (postnuptial agreement must meet requirements of fair and reasonable disclosure, entered into voluntarily and freely,
and substantive provisions fair to each spouse). But
cf. Ching v. Ching, 751 P.2d 93, 97 (Haw. Ct. App.
1988) (general rule that propeny agreements should
be enforced absent fraud or unconscionability
applies to prenuptiai, but not to postnuptial, agreements).
3. This postnuptial agreement was entered into in
California. Under California law, married couples
may contract to change the separate or community
status of their property. Cal. Civil Code §5103
(1990); In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342,
551 P.2d 323, 328 n.6, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1976).
Further, married couples may enter into contracts
with each other concerning their property rights as
though unmarried, subject to rules controlling
~E REPORTS
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actions of persons occupying confidential relations
ersed the trial court's property distribution on other
with each other. Haseltme v. Haseltme, 203 Cai.
grounds.
App. 2d 48, 21 Cai. Rptr. 238, 244 (1962); In re
Estate of Marsh, 151 Cai. App. 2d 356, 311 P.2d
596, 599 (1957). California law is in harmony with
Utah law on the issue of the enforceability and intCite as
erpretation of postnuptial agreements and thus we
136 Utah Adv. Rep. 50
need not resolve the issue of which state's law
should apply.
IN T H E
4. See Matlock v. Matlock, 223 Kan. 679, 576 P.2d
U
T
A
H
COURT
OF A P P E A L S
629, 633 (1978) (" [Contracts, made either before or
after marriage, the purpose of which is to fix proSTATE of Utah,
perty rights between a husband and wife, are to be
Plaintiff and Appellee,
liberally interpreted to carry out the intentions of
the makers and to uphold such contracts where they
v.
are fairly and understandably made, are just and
Vaughn HUMPHREY,
equitable in their provisions, and are not obtained
Defendant and Appellant.
by fraud or overreaching."); Roberts v. Roberts, 381
So. 2d 1333, 1335 (Miss. 1980) ("The rules applicState of Utah,
able to the construction of written contracts in
Plaintiff and Appellee,
general are to be applied in construing a postnuptial
v.
agreement."); Bosone v. Bosone, 53 Wash. App.
Harry
Jamar
Gordon,
614, 768 P.2d 1022, 1024-25 (1989) ("a community
Defendant and Appellant.
property agreement is a contract, and effect should
be given to the clearly expressed intent of the
parties").
No. 890424-CA
5. "Resort to extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent
is permissible only if the contract document appears
No. 890130-CA
to express the parties' agreement incompletely or if
FILED: June 14, 1990
it is ambiguous in expressing that agreement."
Neilson, 780 P.2d at 1267; see also Anderson v.
Gardner, 647 P.2d 3, 4 (Utah 1982) (only when an Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorables James S. Sawaya and Frank G.
ambiguity exists which cannot be reconciled by an
Noel
objective and reasonable interpretation of the agreement as a whole should the court resort to evidence
ATTORNEYS:
beyond the four corners of the agreement).
6. Husband argues on appeal that even if we find Elizabeth Bowman and Elizabeth Holbrook,
Salt Lake City, for Appellant Vaughn
the trial court erred when it found the 1973 agreement was not intended to apply in the event of a
Humphrey
divorce, the error was harmless because of the broad
James C. Bradshaw and Elizabeth Holbrook,
equitable powers trial courts possess in domestic
Salt Lake City, for Appellant Harry Jamar
matters. See Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 789
Gordon
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). However, even if a trial court
R. Paul Van Dam and Sandra Sjogren, Salt
has the equitable power to disregard an otherwise
Lake City, for Appellee State of Utah
enforceable postnuptial property settlement agreement and to distribute the separate property of the
Before Judges Billings, Garff, and
spouses, the circumstances must be unique and
Greenwood.
compelling to justify the application of such an
exception. The trial court made no findings to deliOPINION
neate what it found as compelling circumstances to
justify such an action and we find none.
BU-LINGS, Judge:
In support of his argument, Husband claims that
Utah courts have distributed premarital, gift or
We have consolidated two criminal, interlinheritance property of one spouse to the other
ocutory appeals for decision as they present
spouse. See Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373
the identical legal issue. Appellants Vaughn
(Utah 1988); Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135
Humphrey ("Humphrey") and Harry Jamar
(Utah 1987); Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144,
Gordon ("Gordon7') appeal from two separate
1147-48 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Peterson v. Petedecisions of a district court wherein the trial
rson, 748 P.2d 593, 595-96 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
We find these cases clearly distinguishable as they judge concluded the district court did not have
do not involve an otherwise enforceable prenuptial jurisdiction to review defendants' bindover
or postnuptial agreement.
orders from circuit court. We affirm.
Husband also argues that Utah courts may refuse
Humphrey was charged with sixteen second
to apply property settlement agreements in a divorce
or third degree felonies. Gordon was charged
action. Sec Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah
1975); Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah with manslaughter, a second degree felony. In
both cases, the circuit court held preliminary
Ct. App. 1987). Again, these cases do not deal with
hearings and bound defendants over for trial.
postnuptial property settlement agreements not in
Both defendants were ultimately arraigned
contemplation of divorce and are otherwise factually
distinguishable.
before the district court.
7. We need not consider the issue of whether the
Subsequently, Humphrey and Gordon each
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRUNO D'ASTON,
Plaintiff,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
DOROTHY D'ASTON,
Defendant.
LISA ASTON and ERIC
ASTON,

Civil No. CV 86 1124
Judge Ray M. Harding

Co-defendants.

Plaintiff's Orders to Show Cause against co-defendant Eric Aston and

plaintiff's

Motion for an Order directing the delivery of certain personal property to plaintiff came on
regularly for hearing before the Hon. Ray M. Harding of the above-entitled Court on January
8, 9 and 22, 1990. The plaintiff was present and represented by his counsel, S. Rex Lewis and
Kevin J. Sutterfield, co-defendant Eric Aston was present and represented by his counsel,

Keith W. Meade. The Court, having received evidence and heard testimony of the parties and
other witnesses, considered the memoranda of the parties, heard argument of counsel, having
issued its Memorandum Decision dated January 31, 1990, being fully advised in the premises,
and good cause appearing therefor, now makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court herein entered a Decree of Divorce on or about December 15, 1988,

whereby it awarded various personal property to the plaintiff, including various items which
plaintiff alleges were removed from his car and his motor home on or prior to April 30, 1986.
2.

The divorce decree also awarded to plaintiff a one-half interest in various

personal property located at the marital home of 1171 No. Oakmont, Provo, Utah ("marital
home").
3.

The Decree of Divorce awarded the marital home to defendant

Dorothy

4.

The Decree of Divorce also awarded to the plaintiff other personal items,

D'Aston.

including cameras, lenses, carrying cases, and other optical equipment.
5.

Prior to the separation of plaintiff and defendant Dorothy D'Aston, plaintiff

was involved for numerous years in the buying, selling, and collecting of coins, rare coins, and
other similar items.
6.

On many of plaintiff's rare coins, he stamped the rim above the head with

the letter "A."
7.

Shortly after the plaintiff's personal property disappeared in April, 1986,

plaintiff was able to make a detailed list for the police department from his memory of many
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of the missing items. Some of those items, while not exceptionally rare, would not be expected
to appear in an average coin shop.
8.

On March 15, 1989, Eric Aston made and executed a Bill of Sale to Lloyd Ross

Engle and Jan Chapman Engle to various items of personal property located in the marital
home. Eric Aston assisted in the sale of the real property and accepted a quit claim deed
from defendant Dorothy D'Aston aka Dorothy Aston on March 14, 1989. On the same date,
Eric Aston executed a warranty deed to the Engles for the sale of the marital home. At the
closing of the sale of the property on March 14, 1989, Eric Aston received two trust account
checks from Provo Land Title Company, one for the sum of $58,144.44, and one for the sum
of $58,144.48, for a total cash receipt of $116,288.92.
9.

On April 14, 1989, this Court issued its Writ of Execution and Assistance.

Pursuant to that Writ, John Sindt, a constable of Salt Lake County, took various items into his
possession on April 29, 1989, from co-defendant Eric Aston.
10.

The various property identified as Exhibit 7 at the hearing hereof obtained

by Constable Sindt, was previously located at co-defendant Eric Aston's business known as The
Gold Connection at approximately 21st South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah.
11.

Many coins identical to plaintiff's missing coins, even those which were

unusual, unexplainably appeared in Eric Aston's coin shop. Several of the coins reported
missing by plaintiff were stamped with an "A." Identical coins bearing an "A" were found
among the coins in co-defendant Eric Aston's inventory.
12.

Though given an opportunity, co-defendant Eric Aston has not adequately

explained why he had so many coins identical to plaintiff's missing coins.
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13.

Within the past several months, co-defendant Eric Aston has made significant

purchases, including inventory for his coin shop, several automobiles, and two separate
condominiums. Co-defendant Eric Aston has not plausibly explained the manner and source
of the funds sufficient to purchase the inventory for his coin shop, the automobiles, and
property he has recently acquired.
14.

The Court finds and reasonably infers that much of the capital for co-

defendant Eric Aston's recent purchases came from the sale of plaintiff's coins, many of which
are still missing.
15.

The Court also finds and reasonably infers that co-defendant Eric Aston had

several coins in his possession identical to plaintiff's missing coins because those coins were
actually taken by co-defendant Eric Aston.
16.

The parties have stipulated that co-defendant Eric Aston claims no interest

in the cameras, lenses, cases, and optical equipment found in co-defendant Eric Aston's store,
and that the Court can enter an order awarding the same to plaintiff, which items were
received by plaintiff at the time of the hearing herein.
17.

The parties have also stipulated that plaintiff makes no claim to various

dimes, pennies, nickels, quarters, one-half dollars, dollars, and panda bullion which can be
awarded to co-defendant Eric Aston and were received by him at the time of the hearing
herein.
18.

Plaintiff has met his burden of proving ownership to many of the items

entered as evidence herein.

Plaintiff is the owner of all coins which bear an "A" stamp,

including all of the coins now held by the Court which bear an "A" stamp. A list of the "A"
stamped coins held by the Court is as follows:
4

1892 P
1890
1879
1871 S
1914 S
1881
1890
1922
1923
1924
1934
1896
1904

Morgan Silver Dollar
Carson City Silver Dollar
Metric Proof U. S. Dollar
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - Liberty
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - St. Gaudins
1 set Diving Goose Canadian Dollar
Morgan Silver Dollar
Morgan Silver Dollar
Peace Dollar
Peace Dollar
Peace Dollar
Peace Dollar
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - Liberty
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - Liberty

O
CC
D
S
S
D
S
S

19.

Plaintiff is also the owner of the items held by the Court which match those

items listed on plaintiff's first list of stolen property which was given to the police. These
items on plaintiff's first list of stolen property are as follows:
Complete set of coins of The Golden West (36 coins in set plus 2 Calif, coins).
U. S. Gold Dollars
1
2

1849 - AU
1853 - AU

$2 111 U. S. Gold
1
1
1

1905 - UNC
1915 - AU
1911 - D

$10 U. S. Gold
1
1

1910 - D - UNC
1915 - UNC

$20 U. S. Gold
1
1

1871 - AU
1897 - BU
5

1
1
1

1914 - S - BU
1925 - BU
18.5 gram Alaska gold nugget

2,013 oz. silver bullion (1-oz. rounds; 5-oz. bars; 10-oz. bars; 100-oz. bars)
187 Libertads (1982, 1983, 1984, 1985)

Canada Dollars
13
20
45
120
137
60
1
120
6
470

1958
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1967
1967
1984

-

BU
BU
BU
BU
Type 1, BU, Type 2 BU, Type 3 BU, Type 4 BU and Type 5 BU
LB - BU
D.G. 45° - BU
BU
Canada proof sets with $20 Gold
proof dollars and case

U. S. Proof & Gem Silver Dollars
1

1879 - Metric proof

5 coins of 13 coin Gem set MS - 65 - CC - dollars consisting of 1-1879; 1-1882; 1-1883;
1-1884; and 1-1890.
84
60

Common dates BU - dollars
Common dates CIRC - dollars

Miscellaneous Gold
6
1
3
3
2

1-oz.
1-oz.
Mex
Mex
Mex

- K - Krugeran.
- M - Mapleleaf.
- 2 Peso
- 2 1/2 Peso
- 1947 - 50 Peso - BU

Stamps - one book.
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20.

Plaintiff's later inventories do not appear to have the same reliability as the

original list of stolen property.
21.

Plaintiff is the owner and should receive any items held by the Court which

match the list of consignment items as awarded to plaintiff in the divorce decree, as listed on
Exhibit 24 thereof and which are a part of Exhibit 7 and also described in Exhibit 57. The
bullion which was a part of Exhibit 7 is also a part of the bullion described in Exhibit 57 at
the trial and all of these items are to be returned to plaintiff.
22.

Co-defendant Eric Aston is the owner of the items not included in the above

listing and any furniture which is now in his possession at his store.
23.

Plaintiff has incurred costs of court and is entitled to be awarded them from

the co-defendant Eric Aston.
The Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact, now makes and enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has jurisdiction over the parties to and subject matter of this

2.

The Court should approve the stipulations of the parties made at the hearing

action.

regarding ownership of cameras, lenses, cases, and optical equipment to plaintiff and various
coins to the co-defendant Eric Aston.
3.

Plaintiff should be awarded all coins which bear an "A" stamp, including all

of the coins now held by the Court which bear an "A" stamp, and all items held by the Court
which match those items listed on plaintiff's first list of stolen property which was given to
the police.

7

4.

Plaintiff should also receive any items held by the Court which match the list

of consignment items as awarded to plaintiff in the divorce decree, as listed on Exhibit 24
thereof and which are a part of Exhibit 7 and also described in Exhibit 57.
5.

Plaintiff should be awarded all of the bullion which was a part of Exhibit

7 herein, and which was described in Exhibit 57 herein.
6.

All of the above-described items should be ordered returned to the plaintiff.

7.

Co-defendant Eric Aston should be awarded any items not included in the

above listing and any furniture which is now in his possession at the store.
8.

Plaintiff should be awarded costs of court.

9.

Co-defendant Eric Aston should not be held in contempt for his actions in

assisting in the sale of the marital home and executing the bill of sale on the various personal
property contained therein.
DATED this

>^

day of frobr.uarys 1990.

RATJL
HARDING
D I s M l C T COURT JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

KEITH W. MEADE, ESQ.
Attorney for Co-defendant Eric Aston
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was faxed to the
following, this

X

day of February, 1990.

Keith W. Meade, Esq.
525 East 100 South
Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
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S. REX LEWIS (1953), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345

K:Astn-dec.lo
Our File No. 17,603

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRUNO D'ASTON,
Plaintiff,
ORDER AND DECREE
vs.
DOROTHY D'ASTON,
Defendant.
LISA ASTON and ERIC
ASTON,

Civil No. CV 86 1124
Judge Ray M. Harding

Co-defendants.

Plaintiff's Orders to Show Cause against co-defendant Eric Aston and

plaintiff's

Motion for an Order directing the delivery of certain personal property to plaintiff came on
regularly for hearing before the Hon. Ray M. Harding of the above-entitled Court on January
8, 9 and 22, 1990. The plaintiff was present and represented by his counsel, S. Rex Lewis and
Kevin J. Sutterfield, co-defendant Eric Aston was present and represented by his counsel,

Keith W. Meade. The Court, having received evidence and heard testimony of the parties and
other witnesses, considered the memoranda of the parties, heard argument of counsel, having
issued its Memorandum Decision dated January 31, 1990, being fully advised in the premises,
good cause appearing therefor, and having previously entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters the following:
ORDER AND DECREE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

The stipulations of the parties made at the hearing herein regarding ownership

of cameras, lenses, cases, and optical equipment to plaintiff and various coins to co-defendant
Eric Aston is hereby approved with each party awarded ownership of those items.
2.

Plaintiff is the owner of all of the coins which bear an "A" stamp, including

all of the coins now held by the Court which bear an "A" stamp, and is the owner of the items
held by the Court which match those items listed on plaintiff's first list of stolen property
which was given to the police, more particularly described as follows:
"A" Stamped Coins:
1892 P
1890
1879
1871 S
1914 S
1881
1890
1922
1923
1924
1934
1896
1904

0
CC
D
S
S
D
S
S

Morgan Silver Dollar
Carson City Silver Dollar
Metric Proof U. S. Dollar
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - Liberty
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - St. Gaudins
1 set Diving Goose Canadian Dollar
Morgan Silver Dollar
Morgan Silver Dollar
Peace Dollar
Peace Dollar
Peace Dollar
Peace Dollar
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - Liberty
U. S. $20 Gold Coin - Liberty

2

Plaintiff's First List of Stolen Property:
Complete set of coins of The Golden West (36 coins in set plus 2 Calif, coins).
U. S. Gold Dollars
1
2

1849 - AU
1853 - AU

S2 1/2 U. S. Gold
1
1
1

1905 - UNC
1915 - AU
1911 - D

$10 U. S. Gold
1
1

1910 - D - UNC
1915 - UNC

$20 U. S. Gold
1
1
1
1
1

1871 - AU
1897 - BU
1914 - S - BU
1925 - BU
18.5 gram Alaska gold nugget

2,013 oz. silver bullion (1-oz. rounds; 5-oz. bars; 10-oz. bars; 100-oz. bars)
187 Libertads (1982, 1983, 1984, 1985)
Canada Dollars
13
20
45
120
137
60
1
120

1958
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1967

-

BU
BU
BU
BU
Type 1 BU, Type 2 BU, Type 3 BU, Type 4 BU and Type 5 BU.
LB - BU
D.G. 45 s - BU
BU
3

6
470

1967 - Canada proof sets with $20 Gold
1984 - proof dollars and case

U. S. Proof & Gem Silver Dollars
1

1879 - Metric proof

5 coins of 13 coin Gem set MS - 65 - CC - dollars consisting of 1-1879; 1-1882; 1-1883;
1-1884; and 1-1890.
84
60

Common dates BU - dollars
Common dates CIRC - dollars

Miscellaneous Gold
6
1
3
3
2

1-oz.
1-oz.
Mex
Mex
Mex

- K - Krugeran.
- M - Mapleleaf.
- 2 Peso
- 2 1/2 Peso
- 1947 - 50 Peso - BU

Stamps - one book.
3.

Plaintiff should receive delivery and possession of all items held by the Court

which match the list of consignment items awarded to plaintiff in the divorce decree, as listed
on Exhibit 24 thereof, and which are a part of Exhibit 7 herein and also described in Exhibit
57 herein. These consignment items are included in the items described in paragraph 2 above.
4.

Plaintiff is the owner of all the bullion which was part of Exhibit 7 herein

as described in Exhibit 57 herein.
5.

Plaintiff is hereby awarded court costs in the amount of S?A?9.7£

4

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that codefendant Eric Aston is awarded the items retained by the Court not included in the above
listing and any furniture
his possession
at his store.
riuiure which
wniuu is
15 now
uuw in
m 111s
pusses;
DATED this
tis /

day nf Trlii nnrr, 1990.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

KEITH W. MEADE, ESQ.
Attorney for Co-defendant Eric Aston

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this

-/^

day of February, 1990.

Keith Meade
525 East 100 South
5th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84147

^1AJ\

SECRET AE^
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[5] Further, in viewing all the facts in
the light most favorable to Brinkerhoff, we
can find no prejudice. Harris v. Utah
Transit Auth., 671 P.2d 217, 223-23 (Utah
1983); Moore u Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 868 (Utah 1981).
Brinkerhoff neither below nor on appeal
articulates how he was prejudiced by DLS's
failure to notify him in the notice of hearing that the hearing was going to be informal. It seems clear that no prejudice
would ordinarily occur when an informal
hearing is held under the UAPA because
the litigant has an absolute right to a trial
de novo before the district court. In this
trial de novo, Brinkerhoff was able to
present his entire case before a new tribunal for an independent decision. Based
upon the foregoing, we find the trial court
erred in revoking the order of suspension

peal. Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d
778, 781 (Utah 1986); Condas v. Condas,
618 P.2d 491, 495 n. 8 (Utah 1980).
Finally, Brinkerhoff does not allege, and
cannot show, prejudice because, under the
statutory scheme, he was allowed a trial de
novo after which the trial court has the
responsibility to enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law justifying its decision.
In summary, the trial de novo cured any
technical procedural errors occurring at the
informal DLS hearing. The purpose of allowing an agency to choose an informal
hearing procedure would be defeated if
technical, non-prejudicial, procedural errors
were sufficient to overturn the agency action. The statutory trial de novo is the
proper remedy to cure these non-prejudicial
errors.

by DLS did not state whether the administrative hearing was to be formal or informal as required by Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-3(2)(aXv) (1989).

and preserve his alleged errors. Furthermore, we hold that the trial de novo in the*
district court provided by the UAPA eliminated any prejudice to defendant We
therefore reverse and remand for entry of
an order to reinstate DLS's suspension of
Brinkerhoffs driving privileges.

REASONS FOR THE DECISION
UNDER SECTION 63-46b-5
Brinkerhoff also alleges that DLS violated Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5<lXi) (1989)
by failing to set forth specific reasons for
its suspension of his driving privileges.
This statute states, in pertinent part, that
"[wjithin a reasonable time after the close
of an informal adjudicative proceeding, the
presiding officer shall issue a signed order
in writing that states the following: ... (ii)
the reasons for the decision."
l&l ^ e dispose oi this issue on similar
grounds. First, Brinkerhoff failed to raise
an objection so as to allow DLS to cure any
defect, and second, Brinkerhoff does not
claim, let alone demonstrate, that he was
prejudiced by any alleged error.
The record below shows that Brinkerhoff
made no request of DLS to provide him
with more specific reasons for the suspension of his license. As stated above, a
failure to object to an error and allow a
tribunal to correct its error precludes an
appellant from asserting the issue on apan opportunity to order a continuance to rerae-

DAVIDSON and BENCH, JJ., concur.

Bruno D'ASTON, Plaintiff
and Appellee,
v.
Dorothy D'ASTON, et at, Defendants
and Appellants.
No. 890050-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 9, 1990.
Divorce action was brought The
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Boyd
dy any problem with nonce.

D'ASTON v. D'ASTON
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L. Park, J., entered judgment, and wife
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings,
X, held that (1) service on wife's attorney
of order to show cause why wife should not
be held in contempt was sufficient where
wife secreted herself to prevent service of
order, and (2) wife would be given 30 days
to bring herself within process of trial
court, and if she failed to do so, her appeal
would be dismissed
Ordered accordingly.
1. Divorce <s=>269(8)
Service on wife's attorney of order to
show cause why wife should not be held in
contempt in divorce proceedings was sufficient where wife initially had been served
with process in case and appeared by counsel in matter but subsequently secreted
herself to prevent service of order to show
cause.
2~ Divorce <s=>278
Wife, who had secreted herself and
refused to submit to process of district
court in divorce action, would have 30 days
to bring herself within process of trial
court if she wished to appeal divorce judgment; however, if wife persisted in secreting herself in violation of trial court orders,
her appeal would be subject to dismissal.
Brian C. Harrison (argued), Provo, for
defendants-appellants.
S. Rex Lewis (argued), Leslie W. Slaugh,
Howard, Lewis & Peterson, Provo, for
plaintiff-appellee.
Before BILLINGS, GARFF and
ORME, JJ.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
Appellant, Dorothy D'Aston, filed an appeal from a divorce decree entered by the
trial court on December 15, 1988. Appellee, Bruno D'Aston ("Mr. D'Aston"), filed a
Motion to Dismiss appellant's appeal on the
grounds that she was currently in contempt of the trial court's order and had
secreted herself, refusing to submit to the

process of the district court He thus argues that appellant should not be allowed
to seek a review of the divorce decree on
the merits. We agree with Mr. D'Aston
and therefore stay this appeal and allow
appellant 30 days from the date of the
issuance of this opinion to submit to the
process of the trial court and to give this
court notice of her actions. If appellant
complies with this court's order and gives
this court written verification of her compliance within the 30-day period, then we
will consider her appeal on the merits.
However, if appellant fails to submit to the
process of the trial court within the 30-day
period, the motion to dismiss her appeal
will be granted.
FACTS
We only discuss the facts relevant to this
order, not the underlying dispute.
At the time of trial, appellant testified
that she had $300,000 in cash in a safe
deposit box in Far West Bank and $75,000
in cash in a safe at home. In the divorce
decree, the trial court ordered appellant to
pay Mr. D'Aston $236,800 "from the $300,000.00 in the safe deposit box." To date,
appellant has failed to comply with that
order.
The trial court issued a writ of execution
directing the constable to execute on the
safe deposit box at Far West Bank. The
constable discovered that no such safe deposit box under appellant's name existed,
nor did she have any substantial assets at
Far West Bank.
Mr. D'Aston, on January 11,1989, filed a
Motion to Compel Compliance with Decree
of the Court. On January 23, 1989, appellant filed a Motion for Stay and Approval
of Supersedeas Bond. The trial court ordered ta stay and set the amount of the
supersedeas bond, which was to be posted
within 30 days. Appellant failed to post a
supersedeas bond.
Mr. D'Aston, on March 17,1989, obtained
an Order to Show Cause directing appellant
to appear and show cause why she should
not be held in contempt for her failure to
pay Mr. D'Aston the $236,800 ordered in
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the decree or to post a supersedeas bond. Without authority to hold her in contempt
The process server could not find appellant Appellant thus contends this court may not
is order to serve the Order to Show G^ztse. dismiss her appeal for failure to comply
However, her counsel was served with a With the trial court's orders.
copy of the Order to Show Cause.
[1] Utah courts have acknowledged the
On March 22, 1989, the trial court held a
hearing on Mr. D'Aston's Motion to Compel importance of actual notice in contempt
Compliance. Appellant's counsel was in Proceedings. Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d
court that day and the judge requested his 118, 378 P.2d 519, 520 (1963); see generally
appearance at the hearing. Appellant's Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162,1171counsel stated he was making a special ?2 (Utah 1988). However, whether a court
appearance as he had not been given prop- San issue a civil order of contempt without
er notice of the hearing.
personal service where a party purposefulOn April 7, 1989, the court held an order ly hides to prevent service of the order has
to show cause hearing. Neither appellant Hot been addressed to date in Utah. Nonenor her counsel was present. In a minute theless, we are in accord with other jurisentry, the court noted that the March 22, dictions which have held that where a party
1989, hearing had been continued to April initially has been served with process in a
7, 1989, and that appellant's counsel had Case, and has appeared by counsel in the
been informed of this fact at the March 22, Matter, service of an order to show cause
1989, hearing. la addition, the record re- ^rhy the party should not be held in confleets that appellant's counsel was served tempt on the party's attorney is sufficient
with the Order to Show Cause which listed See Kottemann v. Kottemann, 15ft Cat
the April 7, 1989, hearing date.
4pp,2d 483, 310 P.2d 49, 52 (1957); Brewer
On April 13, 1989, the court entered find- *. Brewer, 206 Ga. 93, 55 S.E.2d 593, 594
ings of fact and conclusions of law holding (1949); State ex rel Brubaker v. Pritchr
appellant in contempt of court because she drd, 236 Ind. 222, 138 N.E.2d 233, 23fr
was "purposefully hiding herself from the (1956); Caplow i/. Eighth Judicial Dist
jurisdiction of the Court and from service," Zourt, 72 Nev. 265, 302 ?2d 755, 7S&
and issued an order of commitment and (1956); Macdermid v. Macdermid, 116 Y.iL
bench warrant The court amended its or- 337, 73 A.2d 315, 318 (1950); see generally*
der of commitment on May 26, 1989. Ap- Annotation, Sufficiency of notice toy or
pellant again evaded service. Appellant's Service upon, contemnor's attorney in
counsel, however, was served with the find- <Hvil contempt proceedings, 60 A.L.B.2d
ings of fact and conclusions of law and the 1244 (1958).
order of commitment
In Kottemann, which is factually similar:
Thereafter, appellant's counsel made a to this case, the plaintiff had left his rest*
Motion to Strike Findings of Fact, Order of 4ence and thus could not be served witK aa
Commitment and BencA Warrant fle as- Motion for contempt 310 P.2d at 50i Thei
serts that he does not know where appel- Plaintiffs attorneys were served witb the
lant is and that his current representation Motion. Id. at 50-51. The attorneys there
is now limited to this appeal. That motion asserted they did not know the where-^
a
was denied.
bouts of their client and only had authority to represent him in the appeal. Id. dim
NOTICE
5l. The court rejected the attorneys" afc|
In response to Mr. D'Aston's motion to ^empts to limit their authority and concl^
dismiss her appeal, appellant argues that ed that the service of the order to showsjl
since she has not been served with the Cause upon the attorneys was proper; i23
Order to Show Cause, the trial court was H 52.1
1. Some jurisdictions have gone so far as to hold
that no formal adjudication of contempt is necessary in order to dismiss the appeal for failure

to comply with a trial court's order. See Tobini
v. Casaus, 128 Cal.App.2d 588, 275 ?2& 792, 795*
(1954) (party could not be found for service of

D'ASTON v. D'ASTON
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The trial court found that appellant was
secreting herself to avoid service of process in this matter. Appellant's counsel
was served with notice of the Motion to
Compel Compliance, the Order to Show
Cause regarding contempt, and the court's
findings of contempt. Appellant's counsel
appeared at the March 22, 1989, hearing on
the Motion to Compel Compliance and was
given notice of the Order to Show Cause
hearing. Because appellant has purposefully hidden to avoid service of process and
notice of the contempt proceedings and the
court's order was given to appellant's attorney, we find the trial court's order of
contempt was properly entered.

(1957) (failure to pay alimony and attorney
fees); Michael v. Michael, 253 N.E.2d 261,
263 (Ind.1969) (appellant took child in violation of custody order and fled jurisdiction);
In re Morrell, 174 Ohio St 427, 189 N.E.2d
873, 874 (Ohio 1963) (appellant took child in
violation of custody order and could not be
found); Huskey v. Huskey, 284 S.C. 504,
327 S.E.2d 359, 360 (Ct.App.1985) (party
left jurisdiction to avoid arrest). Other
courts have allowed the party time to comply with the tnal court's order before dismissing the appeal. Stewart v. Stewart,
91 Ariz. 356, 372 P.2d 697, 700 (1962) (30
days to comply); Tobin v. Casaits, 128
Cal.App.2d 588, 275 P.2d 792, 795 (1954) (30
days to comply); Greenwood v. GreenCONTEMPT
wood, 191 Conn. 309, 464 A.2d 771, 774
[2] Likewise, Utah's appellate courts (1983) (30 days to comply); Pasin v. Pasin,
have not considered whether they may dis- 517 So.2d 742, 742 (Fla.DistCtApp.1987)
miss a civil appeal when the appellant is in (15 days to comp/y); In re Marriage of
contempt of a trial court order in the same Marks, 96 Ill.App.3d 360, 51 IIl.Dec. 626,
action. However, in the area of criminal 629, 420 N.E.2d 1184, 1187 (1981) (30 days
appeals, the Utah Supreme Court has dis- to comply); Henderson v. Henderson, 329
missed the appeal of a prisoner after he Mass. 257, 107 N.E.2d 773, 774 (1952) (30
escaped custody. State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d days to comply); Prevenas v. Prevenas,
703, 704 (Utah 1985); see also Hardy v. 193 Neb. 399, 227 N.W.2d 29, 30 (1975) (20
Morris, 636 P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1981) days to comply); Hemenway v. Hemen(court dismissed an escapee's appeal from a wayr 114 R.L 718, 339 A.2d 247, 250 (1975)
dismissal of a writ of habeas corpus). In (30 days to comply); Strange v. Strange,
Tuttle, the Utah Supreme Court refined its 464 S.W.2d 216, 219 (Tex.CivApp.1970) (per
position in Hardy. The court held that an curiam) (10 days to comply); Pike v. Pike,
appellant prisoner's escape is not an aban- 24 Wash.2d 735, 167 P.2d 401, 404 (1946)
donment of his right to appeal and that the (10 days to comply). " These courts justify
dismissal of his appeal is not an appropri- the dismissal of the appeals on the ground
ate punishment for his escape. Tuttle, 713 that it violates the principles of justice to
P.2d at 704-05. The court stressed the allow a party who flaunts the orders of the
fundamental right to appellate review of a courts to seek judicial assistance. See, eg.,
criminal conviction when reinstating the ap- Stewart, 372 P.2d at 700; Rude, 314 P-2d
peal after the prisoner was returned to at 230; Greenwood, 464 A.2d at 773;
Strange, 464 S.W.2d at 219.
custody. Id. at 705.
Appellate courts from other jurisdictions
have dismissed the civil appeals of contumacious parties without allowing the parties an opportunity to bring themselves
into compliance with the trial court's order.
Rude v. Rude, 153 Cal.App.2d 243, 314
P.2d 226, 230 (1957) (failure to pay support
and attorney fees); Kottemann v. Kottemann, 150 CaLApp.2d 483, 310 P.2d 49, 53
process); Pike v. Pike, 24 Wash.2d 735, 167 P.2d
401, 404 (1946) (party secreted herself and her

Still another approach is to stay the appeal until the appellant has submitted to
the process of the trial court This approach gives the trial court the flexibility
to fashion the terms under which the noncomplying party may purge its contempt
rather than necessarily ordering the enforcement of the judgment In Closset v.
Closset, 71 Nev. 80, 280 P.2d 290, 291
children to avoid custody order and service of
process).
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(1955), the appellant had failed to comply
with a trial court order in a divorce proceeding and had been found in contempt
The Nevada Supreme Court did not dismiss
his appeal for failure to comply with the
judgment below, but held that the appeal
would be dismissed unless the appellant
within 30 days submitted himself to the
process of the trial court or posted a supersedeas bond. Id. 280 P.2d at 291. The
court stated:
[AJppellant husband is now a fugitive
from process of the trial court We shall
not permit him to avail himself of judicial
review while at the same time he places
himself beyond reach of the process of
the trial court in defiance of its attempts
to enforce its judgment

peal on the merits, giving the appellant 15
days to purge its contempt by delivering
the bonds. Id. at 40, 75 S.Ct at 94. The
United States Supreme Court found no constitutional violation, stating that "[w]hile a
statutory review is important and must be
exercised without discrimination, such a review is not a requirement of due process."
Id. at 43, 75 S.Ct. at 95. The Court
stressed that "[petitioner's appeal was not
dismissed because of petitioner's failure to
satisfy a judgment pending an appeal from
it. It was dismissed because of petitioner's
failure to comply with the court's order to
safeguard petitioner's assets from dissipation pending such appeal." Id. at 44, 75
S.Ct at 96.
We are persuaded that the Closset approach
is most consistent with the Utah
We do but insist that one seeking the
aid of the courts of this state should Supreme Court's Tuttle decision and the
remain throughout the course of such United States Supreme Court's Arnold deproceeding, amenable to all judicial pro- cision. By adopting this approach, we do
cess of the state which may issue in not deny appellant her right to an appeal
under Utah Const art VIII, § 5,2 but rathconnection with such proceeding.
er insist she must submit herself to the
Id. at 291 (emphasis added).
The United States Supreme Court con- jurisdiction of the trial court and satisfy
sidered an appellate court's dismissal of a that court's concerns before she may exercivil appeal on the basis that the appellant cise that right She merely has the obliwas in contempt of the trial court's order in gation to come forward and offer a reasonNational Union of Marine Cooks & Stew- able alternative to the trial court to safeards v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37, 75 S.Ct 92, 99 guard her assets from dissipation pending
L.E& 46 (1954). The Court was asked to her appeal.
decide whether the Washington Supreme
Appellant was given the opportunity- to
Court violated either the equal protection post a supersedeas bond, but has refused.
clause or the due process clause of the She has ignored the orders of the trial
fourteenth amendment when it dismissed court and, apart from obtaining a tempoan appeal from a money judgment as a rary stay which she allowed to lapse for
reasonable measure for safeguarding the want, of a bond, she has provided no reacollectibility of that judgment The appel- sonable alternative to allow the court to
lant had filed a notice of appeal, but had
insure that her assets are available to satisoffered no supersedeas bond and had obfy the judgment pending appeal. By her
tained no stay of the proceedings. Id. at
39, 75 S.Ct at 93-94. The trial court or- actions, appellant is frustrating the admindered the appellant to deliver certain bonds istration of justice.
in Us possession to the court's receiver for
safekeeping pending disposition of the appeal. Id. The appellant refused and was
held in contempt Id. As a result, the
Washington Supreme Court struck the ap-

Appellant has not claimed that she did
not have the ability to comply with the trial
court's order. See Stewart v. Stewart, 91
Ariz. 356, 372 P.2d 697, 700 (1962). This
situation is similar to one faced by a Cali-

2. Utah Const, art VIII, § 5 provides, in pertinent
part: "Except for matters filed onginaily with

appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction

the ^utirfcTTi^ rmirt thw* cKol? k— »« oil ^«—-. «—
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fornia court, where it found it was "dealing
with a litigant who not only has previously
failed to appear as ordered, but who up to
this very time remains a fugitive from justice. Apparently, he is unwilling to respond to a court order with which he disagrees, but seeks to obtain on appeal" a
more favorable result Tobin v. Casaus,
128 Cal.App.2d 588, 275 P.2d 792, 795
(1954).
We therefore hold that appellant has 30
days from the date of the issuance of this
opinion to bring herself within the process
of the trial court If appellant submits
herself to the trial court, she should be
allowed an opportunity to offer alternatives
to the trial court to protect the judgment
Appellant may persuade the court it should
hold the disputed judgment amount in trust
until a resolution of this appeal on the
merits. However, if appellant persists in
secreting herself in violation of the trial
court's orders, her appeal will be dismissed
at the expiration of the 30-day period.
GARFF and ORME, JJ., concur.
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Lewis DUNCAN, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of
Patrick Duncan,, deceased; Jason E.
Duncan, a minor by and through his
Guardian ad Litem; Alice Duncan; Noreea Duncanr Michael Duncan; 11m
Duncan; Kevin Duncan; Brian Duncan; Michelle Bowers, individually and
as personal representative of the Estate
of Jefrey and Nicole Bowers, deceased;
Judson Bowers; Florence Hanson;

Shelly Bowers; Sherry Bowers; Monica
Henwood, individually and as personal
representative of the Estate of Ramon
Henwood, deceased; Phyllis Henwood;
and Owen Henwood, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation; The State of Utah;
Paul Kleinman; and Does 1 through
100, inclusive, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 890291-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 12, 1990.
Heirs of victims of train-automobile accident brought action against railroad, Department of Transportation and railroad
engineer. The Third District Court, Tooele
County, Timothy R. Hanson, J., entered
summary judgment dismissing wrongful
death action. Heirs appealed. The Court
of Appeals, J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, held that (1) heirs failed to
establish that either engineer or railroad
were negligent, and (2) Department, having
given at least some warning or control at
railroad crossing, was governmentally immune in deciding whether to improve
means of warning or control at crossing
because of fiscal effects of decision.
Affirmed.
Jackson, J., filed a concurring opinion.
L Railroads «=> 348(1)
Evidence failed to support claim of
heirs of accident victims that there was
negligence in operation of train or entrusting its operation to engineer who was in
charge at time of automobile-train collision.
2. Railroads «=»348<2)
Evidence did not support claim of heirs
of accident victims that railroad negligently
maintained railroadright-of-way^a t crossing with street where train-automobile collision occurred; there was nothing to indicate what could have made railroad's right-
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S. REX LEWIS (1953), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BRUNO D'ASTON,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs.
DOROTHY D'ASTON,
Defendant.

Civil No. CV 86 1124
Judge Boyd L. Park

The defendant Dorothy D'Aston personally appeared before the Court on the 4th
day of May, 1990, in person and was represented by her counsel, Brian C. Harrison.
Plaintiff appeared in person and by his counsel, S. Rex Lewis of Howard, Lewis & Petersen.
The Court considered its Amended Order of Commitment dated the 26th day of May, 1989,
together with its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated April 13, 1989, and having
heard representations made by defendant's counsel, as well as by the defendant, and the
defendant having previously been found in contempt of an order of this Court,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1.

Defendant may purge herself of the contempt order of this Court by

depositing with the Court the sum of $236,800.00. The defendant is given ^6 days from May
4, 1990 to purge herself of her contempt.
2.

In the event the defendant fails to make the aforesaid deposit, the

defendant is ordered committed to jail for a period of sixty (60) days.
3.

Unless previously modified by an Order of this Court, the Court will review

the Commitment Order on June 22, 1990, at the hour of 1:30 p.m. at which time the
defendant is ordered to appear in person before the Court. The Court will make its review
on that date prior to committing the defendant to jail.
4.

The Bench Warrant previously entered herein on the 13th day of April, 1989

is hereby withdrawn.
DATED this

day of May, 1990.

BY THE COURT

L. PARK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the fore&oing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this

day of May, 1990.

Brian C. Harrison, Esq.
3325 No. University Avenue
Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
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